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INTRODUCTION 
The damage tolerance approach to structural safety is centered 
on a philosophy of insuring safe operation in the presence of flaws. 
Accordingly, flaws are assumed to be present at all critical loca-
tions and it is demonstrated that these flaws will not grow to a 
critical size in the usage environment during the next period of 
operation. This process requires bounds on the sizes of the flaws 
that may be in the structure and the bounds must be quantified in 
terms amenable to analysis, i.e., in terms of an equivalent crack 
length, a}IDI' Manufacturing quality control and field inspections 
are intended to eliminate all flaws but the capability of current 
inspection systems can only be expressed in probabilistic terms 
at the small crack sizes of interest. Since no guarantee can be 
given that all flaws greater than aNDI will be detected and 
eliminated, there is a failure risk associated with the damage 
tolerance process. 
To isolate the contribution of the inspection process to the 
risk of failure, assume any crack greater than aNDI will grow to 
critical before the next inspection. The probability of failure 
is then equal to the probability of having a crack longer than 
aNDI in the structure and failing to detect it. This probability 
depends not only on the inspection capability but also on the 
crack sizes in the population of structural details being 
inspected. This paper evaluates the joint effect of NDI and 
crack sizes by calculating the failure probability for selected 
combinations of POD functions and crack size distributions. 
The effect of the NDI process is also considered by calculating 
the percentage of cracks greater than aNDI which are not detected 
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and the percentage of all details which are rejected by the 
inspection. The results of this paper are selected from a much 
larger analysis to be included in an Air Force Wright Aeronautical 
Laboratories report which will be submitted in November 1983. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The probabilities of interest are simple to calculate given 
the probability of detection as a function of crack size, POD(x), 
and the density function of the crack sizes in the population of 
structural details, f(x).l If R(a) represents the probability of 
missing a crack greater than or equal to a, then 
R(a) = t» [l-POD(x)] f(x) dx 
a 
(1) 
Similarly, the probability of finding a crack greater than a is 
given by 
G(a) = ~ POD (x) f(x) dx 
a 
(2) 
Note that G(O) is the total percentage of details which will be 
rejected by the inspection. Since every crack greater than a is 
either found or missed, 
R(a) + G(a) = l-F(a) (3) 
where l-F(a) is the proportion of cracks greater than a. Finally, 
the proportion of cracks greater than a which will be missed by 
the inspection process is 
M(a) = R(a) 1 - F (a) 
POD Functions 
In this study it was assumed that the POD function is 
expressed in terms of the log odds model as given by 
TI tn a-].l -1 POD(a) = {I + exp - [ -- (cr )]} 
13 
(4) 
(5) 
Figure 1 displays th,is model for selected data sets from the Rave 
Cracks program2 and an earlier General Dynamics program. s The 
parameter ].l is the logarithm of the median detection capability, 
a .. while cr reflects the flatness of the POD function, particu-l~iiy at long crack lengths. To eliminate one parameter, all crack 
lengths were considered to be normalized by dividing by the median 
crack detection capability. For normalized crack lengths, ].l = 0 
and all location and scale parameters are expressed as multiples 
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Fig. 1. Sample POD functions of existing systems. 
of the median detection capability. Figure 2 displays POD as a 
function of normalized crack length for selected values of a. As 
noted in Figure 1, existing manual NDI systems have a values of 
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or about 1 or greater. Highly automated systems in the laboratory 
have produced a values in the range of 0.3 to 0.5. No current 
system has been shown to have a 0 value as small as 0.1. The 
calculations of this paper are based on the POD functions of 
Figure 2. 
Crack Size Distributions 
Two distinct approaches were taken in modeling the crack size 
distribution of the population of defects in the structural details 
of interest. The first approach assumed that the crack sizes in 
the population of details have a 2 parameter Weibull distribution 
with constant shape parameter of 1.5. In this model the median 
crack length would be expected to increase, representing the 
growing cracks as the structure is subjected to a stress environ-
ment. This model is consistent with the approach used in studies 
of durability~ and other analyses of structural maintenance. 5,6 
Figure 3 displays four Weibull densities for median normalized 
crack lengths a' = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0. The density for 
a' = 0.1, could be representative of initial quality in aircraft 
manufacturing as a normalized crack length of 0.1 CQuld correspond 
to a real flaw size on the order of 2 to 3 miles.' The densities 
for the larger a' values represent resulting damaging effects of 
fatigue growth and could be present in the structure at 
later stages in its life. 
The second approach was directed at modeling the relatively 
large and relatively rare flaw which is not typical of the 
general population of structural details. This "rogue" flaw can 
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Fig. 2. POD as a function of normalized crack length. 
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Fig. 3. Weibull crack size densities representing 
stages of fatigue damage. 
be introduced in the structure as a manufacturing error, or perhaps, 
accidentally during routine maintenance. The complete model for 
flaw sizes under this approach would assume a crack size density 
of the form 
f(a) = (l-p) f1 (a) + p f2 (a) (6) 
where p is the proportion of details which contain "rogue" flaws 
whose density is f2 (a) and fl (a) is the equivalent crack size 
density which models the initiation and growth of fatigue cracks. 
In this paper, only a "rogue" flaw density was evaluated (Le., 
f 1 (a) = 0) and it was assumed that the "rogue" flaws were 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 10 in the normalized crack 
length scale. Figure 4 displays this "rogue" flaw density 
function and four POD functions. 
NDI CAPABILITY FOR DAMAGE TOLERANCE ANALYSES 29 
I.0r:;:-;r-:::;?'[,-========; 
Fig. 4. Uniform crack size 
distribution represent-
ing "rogue" flaw size. 
1.0 
0.1 
0.01 
0.001 
0.0001 
RESULTS 
POD~'I - lOG 0005, '0.5 • 1.0, ". 1.0 
11"1 - \\{ 1 BUl~ SHAPE PARAIIlTER • 1.5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.1 
fZ(a') • 1/10 
NORMALIZED CRACK LENGTH - " 
Fig. 5. Probability of missing 
cracks for Weibu11 crack 
size distributions and 
o = 1.0 in log odds POD 
model. 
For both models of crack size distributions and for selected 
values of 0 in the log odds POD equation, two measures of 
inspection efficacy were calculated. These were a) the proba-
bility, H(a'), of having a crack longer than a' in the structural 
detail after the inspection, and, b) the proportion, M(a'), of 
cracks longer than a' which are missed by the inspection. 
Weibu11 Distribution of Crack Sizes 
Assume that the crack sizes in the population of structural 
details being inspected have a Weibull distribution with a shape 
parameter of 1.5. Five normalized median crack lengths were con-
sidered to represent the crack size distribution at 5 times during 
the life of the structure. The normalized median crack sizes (a') 
were selected to be 0.1, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 1.0. Since the 
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normalized crack sizes are mUltiples of the median detection 
capability, values of at greater than 1.0 would result in over 
half of the structural details being rejected at the inspection 
and, hence, were not considered. 
Figure 5 presents the probability of missing a crack larger 
than at as a function of at for each of the 5 crack size distri-
butions and for an inspection capability represented by the log 
odds model with median detection capability of 1 (~ = 0) and 
a = 1.0. Interpreting this probability as the probability the 
structural detail will fail during the next operational period, 
the failure risks associated with the choice of particular aNDI 
values can easily be evaluated. Conversely, given a specified 
probability of failure, aNDI can be determined to yield this risk. 
For example, to maintain a constant risk of 0.00001 of missing 
a crack greater than aNDI for the five increasing crack size 
distributions would require aNDI values of 0.6, 1.5, 2.9, 4.1, 
and 5.0. It is also noted that a single aNDI value throughout 
the life of the structure can result in orders of magnitude 
changes in the failure risks for operating periods. 
To quantify the effectiveness of the inspections under the 
conditions of Figure 5, the proportion of cracks greater than the 
normalized crack length which are not detected was calculated. 
These results are presented in Figure 6. For the three shorter 
crack length distributions, the curves are truncated at normalized 
crack lengths which are exceeded once in 10,000 details. The 
curves of Figure 6 indicate that this inspection capability is 
relatively ineffective against the small crack size distributions 
whcih is not at all surprising (see Figure 3). When the median 
crack lengths approach the median inspection capability, a much 
larger proportion of the largest cracks will be detected. But, 
even here, the inspection process is not providing the extremely 
low probabilities of missing a long crack that is required for 
structural safety. For this 'POD function, 1 crack in 1,000 of 
standardized lengths of 45 would not be detected. Therefore, at 
least for this inspection capability, aNDI values which correspond 
to very small failure risks are dominated by the crack sizes and 
not the inspection process. 
Figure 7 presents the percent of details which would be 
rejected at an inspection as a function of median crack length 
for selected inspection capabilities. An acceptable rejection 
percentage would depend on the application but this figure 
indicates that a relatively large percentage of details would be 
rejected if the median crack length is half the median inspection 
capability. For many applications, the cost of repair or 
replacement could be sufficiently great that it would be more 
economical to replace the entire population of structures (i.e., 
durability life has been reached). 
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Uniform Distribution of Crack Sizes 
A different approach to modeling the flaws that may be 
present in a structure is to assume that a proportion, p, of all 
details contains a flaw and the equivalent size of this "rogue" 
flaw has a distribution. In this study it was assumed that the 
rogue flaws (when present) could have any size between 0 and 10 
in the normalized crack length scale, i.e., have a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 10 as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 8 displays both the probability of missing a crack 
longer than normalized crack lengths and the proportion of cracks 
longer than fixed lengths which will not be detected. These 
curves are presented for each of 4 inspection capabilities as 
represented by the four values of cr in the log odds POD model. 
(As before, all four models have a median detection capability 
of one). For cr = 0.1, the two curves were within plotting 
accuracy so only one curve is apparent in the Figure. The 
probability of having a crack longer than 10 after the inspection 
is zero since it was assumed all cracks had lengths less than 10. 
If the critical crack length of the structural details is 10 
(i.e., 10 times the median detection capability), arbitrarily 
small risks can only be achieved by shortening the time between 
inspections. For example if cr = 1.0, aNnI would have to be 
greater than 9.5 in order for H(a') to be less than 0.0015 and 
the next inspection would have to be scheduled before the crack 
could grow to 10. Recall, however, that only a proportion, p, 
of the details have cracks so that the overall failure risk is 
pH(aNo1) for whatever the selected value of aNnI. The 
proportion of cracks greater than a' which are not detected 
is much smaller in this model since the crack sizes are large 
compared to the inspection. 
DISCUSSION 
Initial crack size assumptions in damage tolerance analyses 
are generally considered to be determined by the capability of a 
quality control or field inspection process. For example, common 
interpretation of the initial flaw sizes in MIL-A-83444 is that 
there is 95 percent confidence that at least 90 percent of all 
flaws of this equivalent length or longer will be detected. While 
there is little comfort in a 90 percent POD, the 95 percent 
confidence was assumed to add a sufficient (but not quantifiable) 
degree of conservatism. The calculations of this paper suggest 
that if a known failure risk is to be maintained throughout the 
life of the structure, the size of the flaws play an equally 
important, if not dominant, role in establishing a value for 
aNDI· 
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Two models of crack lengths were considered. With the Weibull 
model (which has been used to represent initiating and growing 
fatigue cracks in aircraft structure) and with a currently repre-
sentative POD model (log odds with cr = 1), aNDI values must 
increase to maintain a constant failure probability. Early in the 
life of the structure, the aNDI values are essentially determined 
by the crack size distribution. In fact, there is little benefit 
from even performing the inspection since even if a relatively 
large crack was present, there would also be a relatively large 
chance (greater than 20 percent) that it would be missed. Later 
in life when the cracks are larger, the inspections find a larger 
proportion of the big cracks but a major proportion of the details 
would also require repair or maintenance. 
A rogue flaw model was also considered which in some respects 
is more realistic than the Weibull. In practice, discernable 
defects may never be found in some of the structural details and 
this situation can be modeled by the mixture of density functions 
expressed in equation (6). The "uncracked" details result from 
extremely small equivalent initial cracks. While this model has 
intuitive appeal, the hopefully very small proportion, p, of 
details with rogue flaws would need to be estimated before an 
overall probability of failure could be calculated. Since the 
Weibull analysis indicated that current inspection capabilities 
do not have significant impact on a distribution of small cracks, 
calculations were made only for one uniform distribution of the 
"rogue" flaws. These calculations demonstrated once again the 
desireability of improving NDI systems by obtaining steeper POD 
functions (i.e., smaller cr values in the log odds model). 
When the distribution of crack sizes is assumed to be uniform, 
the probability of missing cracks greater than aNDI is proportional 
to the area between 1 and the POD function above aNDI and less than 
the maximum crack size. This measure is intuitively appealing as 
it depends only on the inspection capability as measured by the 
POD function. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In quantifying NDI capability for damage tolerance analysis 
three computations should be considered: a) the probability of 
not detecting a crack greater than aNDI; b) the percent of cracks 
greater than aNDI which are not detected; and, c) the total 
percent of details which are rejected. To perform these calcula-
tions, the inspection capability must be modeled in terms of its 
entire POD function and some probabilistic model of the crack 
sizes that are present in the population of structural details 
must be available. 
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DISCUSSION 
From the Floor: I have a question. In your analysis, are you going 
to optimize the inspection intervals and are you going to find 
critical crack size which NDE should be able to detect at that 
particular inspection? 
A.P. Berens: I'm going to recommend that you set the aND value to 
get the risk of missing a big crack that you want. To do that, 
you need some kind of projection of the crack size distribution 
you are going to have at the point of inspection. To optimize 
inspection intervals, I think, is going beyond the scope of 
what you are doing because you get into specific details from 
each of the types of structures you are talking about and I 
don't think there is an answer to that question. 
Our study was aimed more at the question of how or what is a 
method for defining ~ and what kind of sampling variation 
can you tolerate in es~Imating the parameters of a P.O.D. model, 
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because eventually, at least in the Air Force situation, they 
have got to get down to a P.D.D. model or something which 
translates into damage tolerance. 
